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ABSTRACT 
YE CAI: Board Connections and M&A Transactions 
(Under the direction of Merih Sevilir and Anil Shivdasani) 
We examine M&A transactions between firms with current board connections and 
show that acquirers obtain significantly higher announcement returns in such transactions. 
Acquirer announcement returns in transactions with a first-degree board connection where 
the acquirer and the target share a common director are 2.46% greater than those in non-
connected transactions. Similarly, acquirer announcement returns in transactions with a 
second-degree board connection where one director from the acquirer and one director from 
the target serve on the board of a third firm are 1.62% greater than those in non-connected 
transactions. Our results suggest that first-degree board connections benefit acquirers by 
allowing them to acquire the target at a lower takeover premium. Second-degree board 
connections, on the other hand, benefit acquirers by resulting in greater value creation from 
the deal, as evidenced by greater combined acquirer and target announcement returns and 
better post-merger operating performance in such deals.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines M&A transactions with a current board connection between 
acquirer and target firms and presents evidence that acquirers obtain significantly higher 
announcement returns in such transactions. We study two types of board connections 
between acquirer and target firms. The first type is where the two firms share a common 
director before the deal announcement and we refer to this type of connection as a “first-
degree connection”. The second type is where one director from the acquirer and one director 
from the target have been serving on the board of a third firm before the deal announcement. 
We refer to this type of connection as a “second-degree connection”. We focus only on 
current board connections in that the acquirer and the target must have a board connection 
through their directors at the time of the deal announcement. This is because current board 
connections are presumably more observable to shareholders and are more important for 
information flow and performance of current M&A transactions than other types of board 
connections existed in the past.
The expected effect of board connections on M&A outcomes is not obvious. On the 
one hand, having a board connection between two firms may improve information flow 
between the firms, and increase each firm’s knowledge and understanding of the other firm’s 
operations, business, and corporate culture, with a positive effect on M&A outcomes.  On the 
other hand, a board connection between two firms may make it easier for executives and 
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directors to develop personal relationships in circles outside the firm, and to propose and 
implement deals with a personal agenda at the detriment of their shareholders.  
In our sample of 1,664 US acquisitions between 1996 and 2008, we observe a board 
connection between the acquirer and the target in 9.4% of the transactions. In terms of dollar 
deal values, connected transactions represent 19.8% of the overall transaction volume from 
1996 to 2008. We evaluate the effect of board connections on M&A transactions by studying 
announcement returns, takeover premiums, long-run operating performance of the newly 
merged firm, and advisory fees paid to investment banks. In first-degree connected 
transactions, we first find that acquirer abnormal returns from two days before to two days 
after the acquisition announcement are 2.46% higher than those in non-connected 
transactions. This effect is economically large given that the unconditional mean acquirer 
announcement return is -2.16% in our sample.  In addition, we find lower target 
announcement returns and lower takeover premiums in the presence of a first-degree 
connection. We do not find a significant difference in combined acquirer and target 
announcement returns between first-degree connected transactions and non-connected 
transactions. This suggests that although first-degree connections benefit acquirers, they are 
not related to greater overall value creation from the deal. Finally, we find that advisory fees 
are lower in first-degree connected transactions, consistent with the view that connected 
directors have an information advantage about the true value of the target and synergies from 
the deal, which reduces the need for investment banks to price and structure the deal. A first-
degree connection is associated with a 0.64% reduction in advisory fees as a percentage of 
deal value. This effect is economically important given that the mean percentage advisory fee 
for our sample is 1.30%.  
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  Similar to transactions with a first-degree connection, acquirer shareholders obtain 
higher announcement returns in transactions with a second-degree connection as well. 
Acquirer announcement returns are 1.62% higher in the presence of a second-degree 
connection, compared to those in non-connected transactions. Different from first-degree 
connections, however, target shareholders neither experience lower announcement returns 
nor obtain lower takeover premiums in such transactions. More importantly, combined 
announcement returns are 1.74% higher in these deals, relative to non-connected deals. This 
effect is economically meaningful given the mean combined announcement return is 1.03% 
in our sample. In addition, the post-deal operating performance of the combined firm is better 
in transactions with a second-degree connection, suggesting that such deals are associated 
with better performance in the long run as well.
Taken together, although both types of board connections are related to greater 
acquirer announcement returns, our results suggest that the economic mechanisms driving 
these superior returns are different in first and second-degree connections. First-degree 
connections benefit acquirers by allowing them to acquire the target at a lower price without 
resulting in greater value creation from the deal. In contrast, second-degree connections 
benefit acquirers by resulting in greater value creation from the deal, as evidenced by higher 
combined announcement returns and better post-deal operating performance of the combined 
firm in such deals.   
An important concern for our analysis is that board connections do not arise randomly 
and they may be related to certain omitted firm characteristics which could independently 
affect M&A outcomes. To address such endogeneity concerns, we conduct a number of 
robustness tests. One possibility is that it is the acquisition experience of the acquirer which 
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explains our results. Firms with greater acquisition experience may be more likely to gain 
connected directors as a result of past acquisitions, and they may also be less likely to 
undertake value-destroying deals. It is also possible that firms with greater similarity, firms 
with previous business relations, and firms located at a closer distance to each other are more 
likely to have common directors and to generate better M&A outcomes when they merge. 
Another possibility is that firms with better corporate governance and higher quality directors 
are more likely to have board connections given that there may be a great demand for their 
high quality directors. Such firms could also be more likely to engage in high quality M&A 
deals. To address these possibilities, we control for the acquisition history of the acquirer, 
similarity between the acquirer and the target, the existence of a previous business relation 
between the acquirer and the target, geographical proximity between the acquirer and the 
target, and board quality and corporate governance of the acquirer. We verify that the 
positive effect of board connections on acquirer announcement returns remains robust after 
including all these control variables. 
 To rule out any remaining unobservable characteristics of connected acquirers which 
may lead to better M&A outcomes, we perform an analysis with firm-fixed effects where we 
compare the deals in which the acquirer has a board connection to the target with those deals 
by the same acquirer in which the acquirer has no board connection to the target. If board 
connection is a simple proxy for firm quality, such acquirers should generate better M&A 
performance independent of whether they acquire connected or non-connected targets. Our 
results, however, show that these acquirers obtain higher announcement returns from their 
acquisitions of connected targets.  
5

There has been a recent and growing literature examining the role of board 
connections and networks in corporate financial policies.1 Our paper is closely related to Ishii 
and Xuan (2010) who examine the effect of social ties between acquirer and target firms on 
merger performance. As opposed to our finding that professional connections present at the 
time of the acquisition announcement have a positive effect on acquirer announcement 
returns, Ishii and Xuan (2010) find that social ties between acquirer and target firms have a 
negative effect on acquirer announcement returns. The two papers are different in terms of 
the types of board connections they study. Our paper focuses on professional rather than 
social board connections in that the acquirer and the target must have a board connection at 
the time of the acquisition announcement. In Ishii and Xuan (2010), on the other hand, firms 
are classified as socially connected if they have executives who went to the same school or 
worked at the same firm in the past.  There is a possibility that current and professional board 
connections we analyze in our paper are a subset of broader social and school ties among 
executives. This is not a concern for our first-degree board connections since such 
connections involve only one director connecting two firms. For our second-degree 
connections, we manually collect data on the educational backgrounds of connected directors 
and find that only two directors in our sample exhibit the type of school connections defined 
in Ishii and Xuan (2010). This finding suggests that the set of professional board connections 
at the time of the acquisition announcement does not overlap with the set of social 
connections formed in the past, and provides an explanation for why our paper identifies a 
positive effect of board connections on M&A outcomes while Ishii and Xuan (2010) identify 

1 See, for example, Hallock (1997), Fich and White (2003), Hwang and Kim (2009), and Engelberg, Gao, and 
Parsons (2009) on the effect of director networks on CEO pay, Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) on the 
effect of networks in the venture capital industry, and Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) and Kuhnen (2009) 
on the effect of social ties in the mutual fund industry.

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a negative effect. Together, these studies illuminate the mechanisms by which social and 
professional ties affect M&A outcomes, and suggest that differentiating professional ties 
from social ties is critical in understanding how different types of board connections impact 
M&A performance. 
In other related work, Schonlau and Singh (2009) find that firms with more connected 
boards to other firms are more likely to undertake acquisitions as well as to be acquired. Such 
firms also exhibit better performance in the years after the acquisition. Their paper analyzes 
the acquisition activity of a firm as a function of how connected its board is to other firms, 
but does not look at direct board connections between acquirer and target firms—the primary 
focus of our paper.  In other work, Fracassi (2008) constructs a measure of social ties 
between two firms and shows that firms with a greater level of social ties exhibit similar 
investment patterns. Rather than focusing on inter-firm connections, Schmidt (2008) 
investigates the costs and benefits of internal ties between the CEO and the board members 
of a given firm, and finds that more friendly boards are associated with higher announcement 
returns for acquirers with greater advisory needs. Fracassi and Tate (2008) present evidence 
that greater level of connections between the CEO and the directors within a firm is related to 
weaker board monitoring and lower market valuation.  
 The organization of the paper is as follows.  Chapter 2 introduces our sample and 
reports summary statistics. Chapter 3 analyzes the relation between board connections and 
acquisition announcement returns. Chapter 4 examines the impact of board connections on 
the long-run operating performance of the combined firm. Chapter 5 investigates financial 
advisory fees paid to investment banks in the presence of a board connection. A final chapter 
concludes.
CHAPTER 2 
DATA AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Our sample of acquisitions is from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) US Mergers 
and Acquisitions database. We begin with all completed mergers and acquisitions with the 
announcement date and the effective date between 1996 and 2008. We identify all deals in 
which both the acquirer and the target are public firms, and the acquirer controls less than 
50% of the target before the acquisition announcement and owns 100% after the transaction. 
We require that both the acquirer and the target have annual financial statement information 
available from Compustat and daily stock return data from CRSP. We further eliminate small 
transactions in which the deal value disclosed in the SDC is less than $5 million, or less than 
1% of the acquirer’s market capitalization measured on the sixth trading day prior to the 
announcement date.  
We choose our time period from 1996 to 2008 because the SEC has mandated all 
registrants to file their documents online using the EDGAR system starting from 1996. The 
EDGAR database has over 600 different types of forms, and for the purpose of our study, we 
gather all available proxy statements (Form DEF 14-A). Proxy statements provide detailed 
information for each director, such as their name, age, work experience, board affiliation, and 
education background. We also supplement our director data using the RiskMetrics (formerly 
IRRC) Directors database. This data is of annual frequency and covers directors of S&P500, 
S&P MidCaps, and S&P SmallCaps firms. We require that both the acquirer and the target 
have proxy statements in EDGAR or have available director information in the RiskMetrics 
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database in the year immediately prior to the deal announcement. Our final sample consists 
of 1,664 M&A transactions which meet these criteria. 
For each M&A transaction, we read through the director information sections of the 
acquirer’s and the target’s proxy statements in the year prior to the acquisition 
announcement. If the acquirer and the target share at least one common director, the deal is 
classified as a transaction with a first-degree connection.  Similarly, if at least one director 
from the acquirer and one director from the target serve together on the board of a third 
company, the deal is classified as a transaction with a second-degree connection.  Among the 
1,664 M&A deals in our sample, there is a board connection between the acquirer and the 
target in 156 deals. In 65 out of 156 connected transactions we have a first-degree 
connection, and in the remaining 91 transactions we have a second-degree connection.
In 12 of the 65 first-degree connections, the connected director is an independent 
director at both the acquirer and the target. In 42 observations, the connected director is an 
executive at the acquirer, and in 15 observations he is an executive at the target.1 In the case 
of second-degree connections, the connected director at the acquirer is an independent 
director in 74 out of 91 transactions, and he is an executive at the acquirer in the remaining 
17 transactions. Similarly, the connected director at the target is an independent director in 75 
transactions, and an executive at the target in the remaining 16 transactions. These patterns 
suggest that connected directors are less likely to be independent in first-degree connections 
than in second-degree connections. Finally, we observe that a typical board connection 
between the acquirer and the target originates five years before the announcement of the deal.

1 Some connected directors are executives at both the acquirer and the target, such as being the CEO of the 
acquirer and the non-executive chairman of the target. This explains why the sum of independent and executive 
directors in first-degree connections is greater than the number of first-degree board connections in our sample. 
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Panel A of Table 1 presents the distribution of our M&A sample by announcement 
year. Consistent with Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), the number of acquisitions 
drops in the early 2000s from its highest level in 1999, rebounds back in 2003, and then hits 
another trough in 2008. The pattern of connected transactions across years follows a similar 
trend as the overall sample. There is a board connection between the acquirer and the target 
in about 10% of the transactions. In terms of dollar deal values, connected transactions 
represent 19.8% of the overall transaction volume from 1996 to 2008.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows the industry distribution of our sample of acquisitions based 
on the industry of the acquirer firm where industry classification follows the twelve Fama-
French industry definitions (Fama and French (1997)). Finance, Business Equipment, and 
Healthcare are the most active industries in our sample in terms of the number of 
acquisitions. We observe the same pattern for connected transactions as well where the 
greatest number of connected acquisitions take place in the Finance industry, followed by 
Business Equipment and Healthcare industries. Overall, transactions with board connections 
do not concentrate strongly by industry and their industry distribution exhibits a similar 
pattern as the overall M&A sample. Our analysis later will include both year and industry 
fixed effects to control for industry and time trends affecting M&A activity.2
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for various acquirer, target, and deal 
characteristics. We describe the variable construction in more detail in the Appendix. The 
table first presents the means for the full sample, followed by the three subsamples of first-
degree connected transactions, second-degree connected transactions, and non-connected 
transactions. It is interesting to note that target firms in first-degree connected deals have 

2 We also conduct robustness checks by removing the deals where the acquirer is in the Finance industry and 
excluding the internet bubble period from our sample. 
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lower return on assets, smaller amount of operating cash flow, and exhibit poorer industry-
adjusted stock price performance in the six month-period prior to the acquisition 
announcement. These patterns suggest that these firms underperform their industry peers, and 
might represent attractive takeover opportunities. In terms of deal characteristics, both types 
of connected transactions are more likely to be diversifying acquisitions, although 
significantly so only in second-degree connected transactions where a transaction is defined 
as diversifying if the acquirer and the target do not share the same two-digit SIC code. This 
suggests that connected transactions are less likely to combine similar firms from related 
industries relative to non-connected transactions. 3 Finally, transactions with a first-degree 
connection are less likely to be mergers of equals.

3 This observation is not surprising given that the Clayton Act of 1914 prohibits directors from simultaneously 
serving on the boards of competing firms. 
CHAPTER 3 
BOARD CONNECTIONS AND ANNOUNCEMENT RETURNS 
3.1 Univariate Analysis  
To measure the effect of an acquisition on the value of the acquirer and the target, we 
obtain cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using the standard event study method 
developed by Brown and Warner (1985). We use the CRSP value-weighted return as the 
market return and estimate the market model parameters over the period from event day -210 
to event day -11. We follow Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) and form a value-weighted 
portfolio of the acquirer and the target with the weights based on their market capitalization 
at the eleventh trading day prior to the acquisition announcement date. Table 3 presents the 
cumulative abnormal returns for acquirer (ACARs), target (TCARs) as well as combined 
portfolio of acquirer and target firms (PCARs) around the acquisition announcement. We 
report the mean and median CARs over three different windows: the three-day event window 
(-1, +1), the five-day event window (-2, +2), and the seven-day event window (-3, +3), where 
the event day 0 is the acquisition announcement date. In the remainder of the paper, we refer 
to the announcement returns over the five-day event window (-2, +2) in discussing the effect 
of board connections on M&A outcomes.  
Table 3 Column (1) shows the mean and median CARs for the full sample. We find 
that the mean five-day abnormal return for acquirers is -2.16% and significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. Although the mean announcement return for our sample of 
acquirers is lower than what is reported in other studies such as Fuller, Netter, and 
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Stegemoller (2002) and Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007), this is not very surprising given that 
our sample contains only public targets. The negative ACARs are in line with the earlier 
findings that on average M&A transactions destroy value for acquirer shareholders when 
they involve acquisitions of public firms (Fuller et al. (2002)). The mean five-day abnormal 
return for target firms is 21.12%, and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The 
mean five-day combined abnormal return PCAR is 1.03%, consistent with the positive 
combined returns documented by Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), Moeller et al. 
(2004), and Wang and Xie (2009). Median CARs show a similar pattern as the means. 
We next split the entire M&A sample into three groups based on whether a deal 
involves a board connection and the type of the connection, and present the subsample CAR 
results. Most importantly, mean ACARs are not significantly different from zero in both first 
and second-degree connected transactions, while in non-connected transactions the mean 
five-day ACAR is -2.35% and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This result 
suggests that acquisitions of public firms do not lead to value destruction for acquirer 
shareholders if the acquirer and the target have a board connection at the acquisition 
announcement. The mean and median difference in five-day ACARs between first-degree 
connected transactions and non-connected transactions are 2.46% and 1.81% respectively, 
and significant at the 10% level. They are also economically large compared to the sample 
mean ACAR of -2.16% and median ACAR of -1.67%. Similarly, the mean and median 
difference in five-day ACARs between second-degree connected transactions and non-
connected transactions are 1.62% and 1.15%, and significant at the 5% and 10% level 
respectively. This finding that acquirers do not experience significantly negative 
announcement returns in connected transactions is important since numerous studies have 
13

shown that acquisitions of public targets destroy value for the acquirer. For instance, Bradley 
et al. (1988) report a -3% abnormal returns to acquirers of 1980s, Wang and Xie (2009) 
document a -2.9% acquirer announcement return for a sample of acquisitions where both 
acquirers and targets are covered by the IRRC database, and Moeller et al. (2004) find a -
1.7% average abnormal return for large acquirers acquiring public firms over the period from 
1980 to 2004.
Target shareholders, on average, experience a sizeable announcement return in both 
connected and non-connected transactions. Specifically, they obtain five-day announcement 
returns of 18.62% in first-degree connected transactions, 22.70% in second-degree connected 
transactions, and 21.13% in non-connected transactions, all significantly different from zero 
at the 1% level.  Although mean target announcement returns are lower in first-degree 
connected transactions and higher in second-degree connected transactions than those in non-
connected transactions, the differences in the univariate comparison are not significant.
Combined announcement returns are positive for both connected and non-connected 
transactions, suggesting that an average M&A transaction in our sample creates value. 
Although there is no significant difference between first-degree connected transactions and 
non-connected transactions in terms of the overall value creation at the acquisition 
announcement, we find that the combined announcement returns are significantly larger in 
second-degree connected transactions than in non-connected transactions. The mean 
difference in five-day PCARs between second-degree connected transactions and non-
connected transactions is 1.74% and economically significant compared to the sample 
average PCAR of 1.03%. 
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Given that M&A transactions come in waves and exhibit industry clustering, we 
perform a number of robustness checks to make sure that our results are not specific to a 
certain industry or a particular time period. We repeat our univariate analysis in different 
subsamples by removing bank mergers (where the acquirer has an SIC code between 6000 
and 6999), by removing the Internet bubble period from 1998 to 2001, and by conducting our 
analysis using the first and second-half of our sample period separately. Our untabulated 
results show that the effect of board connections on announcement returns remains robust in 
each of these specifications. 
Taken together, our results from the univariate analysis of announcement returns 
suggest that acquirers do better in transactions with both first and second–degree board 
connections in terms of the announcement returns they experience. In addition, deals with a 
second-degree connection appear to be more value creating given that combined 
announcement returns in such deals are significantly larger than those in non-connected 
transactions.  
3.2 Multivariate Analysis  
3.2.1 Acquirer Announcement Returns 
In this section, we check the robustness of our finding on the positive effect of board 
connections on acquirer returns in a multivariate setting by controlling for factors which have 
been shown to affect announcement returns by earlier work. The dependent variable in these 
regressions is the five-day ACAR. The key independent variables are a first-degree board 
connection indicator variable First-degree Connection that takes on the value of one if there 
is a first-degree connection between the acquirer and the target, and zero otherwise, and a 
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second-degree board connection indicator variable Second-degree Connection that takes on 
the value of one if there is a second-degree connection between the acquirer and the target, 
and zero otherwise. 
Following Moeller et al. (2004), we include a variable Acquirer Size defined as the 
logarithm of the acquirer’s market capitalization at the eleventh trading day prior to the 
acquisition announcement. We control for the method of payment by including an indicator 
variable Stock Deal that takes on the value of one if the acquisition is financed partially or 
fully with stock, and zero otherwise. We also control for whether the deal is diversifying by 
including an indicator variable Diversifying Acquisition that takes on the value of one if the 
acquirer and the target do not share the same two-digit SIC code, and zero otherwise. We 
include a variable Relative Deal Size as the ratio of deal value to acquirer’s market 
capitalization. In addition, we control for whether the deal is done in the form of a tender 
offer, whether the deal is hostile, as well as acquirer and target firms’ Tobin’s Q, leverage, 
operating cash flow, all measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition 
announcement, and pre-announcement stock price run-up measured over the [-210,-11] event 
window. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, and the t-statistics are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. 
Regression (1) in Table 4 presents our results. The coefficients on First-degree
Connection and Second-degree Connection are both positive and significant at the 10% and 
1% level respectively. Acquirers experience abnormal returns that are 2.4% higher in 
transactions with a first-degree connection and 1.8% higher in transactions with a second-
degree connection, compared to transactions with no connection. These magnitudes are 
economically large relative to the mean ACAR of -2.16% in our sample. Hence, our key 
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result on the positive relation between board connections and acquirer announcement returns 
continues to hold after controlling for the factors affecting acquirer returns known in the 
literature.   
The coefficients on the other control variables are consistent with the findings in the 
literature. Similar to Moeller et al. (2004), we find a negative correlation between acquirer 
size and ACAR. We also find that stock-financed deals have lower ACARs, consistent with 
Travlos (1987) and Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990). Acquisitions with greater deal size 
relative to the size of the acquirer have lower ACARs, in line with the finding in Moeller et 
al. (2004). In addition, acquirers in tender offers and acquirers with higher operating cash 
flows perform better, as in Moeller et al. (2004) and Masulis et al. (2007). Acquirers with 
greater stock price run-up prior to the acquisition announcement have lower ACARs, 
consistent with Masulis et al. (2007), and supporting the view that such acquisitions might be 
motivated to a greater extent by the overvalued stock of the acquirer. Finally, ACARs are 
higher when the target has lower operating cash flow. 
Alternative Explanations  
Our results so far suggest that board connections are associated with better 
announcement returns for acquirers. In this section, we proceed with different specifications 
of our multivariate analysis to evaluate whether the observed difference in acquirer 
announcement returns between connected and non-connected transactions could be explained 
by alternative mechanisms. A concern for our analysis is that board connections do not arise 
randomly and they may be related to certain omitted firm characteristics which could 
independently affect M&A outcomes. To address such endogeneity concerns, we conduct a 
number of additional tests. Specifically, we investigate whether the positive relation between 
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board connections and acquirer returns can be explained by the acquirer’s acquisition history, 
greater firm similarity between the acquirer and the target in connected transactions, 
existence of a previous business relation between the acquirer and the target, greater 
geographic proximity between the acquirer and the target, and corporate governance, board 
characteristics, and other unobservable firm characteristics of the acquirer in connected 
transactions.  
Acquirer Acquisition Experience: One possible explanation for the positive relation 
between board connections and acquirer returns is that firms which are more frequent and 
experienced acquirers may gain more connected directors on their boards as an outcome of 
their past acquisitions. At the same time, they may also be less likely to undertake value-
destroying deals due to their acquisition experience. To evaluate this possibility, in Table 4 
Regression (2), we add a new variable Acquirer Pre3YR Num of Deals which measures the 
total number of acquisitions an acquirer has made in the past three years preceding the 
current acquisition announcement. This variable does not show up significantly, and both 
first and second-degree board connection indicators remain significant in explaining 
ACARs.1
Firm Similarity between the Acquirer and the Target: Firms with greater similarity 
could be more likely to have common directors on their boards. At the same time, more 
similar firms may also be expected to undertake better M&A deals. To address this 
possibility, we investigate whether acquirer and target firms exhibit greater similarity in 
connected transactions than in non-connected transactions. Given that firms in related 
industries are expected to display greater similarity, first we revisit our earlier observation on 

1 Our results are robust if we replace Acquirer Pre3YR Num of Deals with the volume of acquisitions an 
acquirer has engaged in during the past three years as a percentage of the acquirer’s current market 
capitalization.  
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the industry classifications of acquirer and target firms in connected transactions.  Acquirer 
and target firms share a same two-digit SIC code in 62% of the first-degree connected 
transactions, in 59% of the second-degree connected transactions, and in 70% of the non-
connected transactions. Thus, in terms of industry classification, connected transactions are 
less likely to combine similar firms from related industries. Our second measure of firm 
similarity Corr(Stock Return) is the stock return correlation between the acquirer and the 
target in the six-month period ending one month prior to the acquisition announcement 
(Fama and French (1992)). In Table 4 Regression (3) which includes these two measures of 
firm similarity, we continue to find that both types of board connections are positively related 
to acquirer announcement returns. Hence, it is unlikely that our results can be explained by 
greater similarity between the acquirer and the target in connected transactions.  
Previous Business Relation between the Acquirer and the Target: M&A transactions 
between connected firms might be preceded by a business relation between the acquirer and 
the target, and formation of such business relations is positively correlated with one or both 
firms gaining a board of director from the partner firm. If the two firms in such a relation end 
up merging subsequently, such transactions could be expected to generate better 
announcement returns for the acquirer due to the previous business relation between the two 
firms. In other words, the existence of a previous business relation between the acquirer and 
the target may be driving board connections as well as higher acquirer announcement returns.  
To understand whether our results are driven by a previous business relation between 
the acquirer and the target, we add additional control variables into our specification. In 
Regression (4), we include a Previous Business Relation indicator variable that takes on the 
value of one if there exists any kind of alliance and joint venture activity between the 
19

acquirer and the target in the three years prior to the acquisition announcement, and zero 
otherwise. We obtain our alliance and joint venture data from the SDC Joint 
Ventures/Alliances database. The second variable we include in Table 4 Regression (4) is the 
acquirer’s toehold in the target prior to the acquisition announcement given the possibility 
that previous business relations might involve an equity investment by the acquirer in the 
target. We create a Toehold indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the acquirer 
has an equity stake in the target before the deal announcement, and zero otherwise. Note that 
in only 2.6% of our M&A sample, the acquirer possesses a toehold in the target prior to 
launching a bid. Regression (4) shows that including the two new control variables does not 
change our main results, and both types of board connections remain positively related to 
acquirer returns. In addition, neither the Previous Business Relation variable nor the Toehold
variable is significantly related to acquirer announcement returns. 
Geographic Proximity between the Acquirer and the Target: Kedia, Panchapagesan, 
and Uysal (2007) find that acquirer announcement returns in local transactions are higher 
than those in non-local transactions where a local transaction is defined as having the 
acquirer and the target’s headquarters located within 100km of each other. If geographically 
closer firms are more likely to have common board of directors, our results regarding higher 
acquirer returns could be driven by the greater geographic proximity of the acquirer and the 
target in connected transactions. To evaluate this possibility, we add geographic proximity 
variables into our regression. We obtain data on the city and the state of acquirer and target 
firms from the SDC, and match this data from the US Census Bureau Gazette to get the 
latitude and the longitude for each acquirer and target firm. The geographic distance between 
each acquirer and target firm’s headquarters is then calculated using the Great Circle 
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Distance Formula.2 In Table 4 Regression (5) we include the same Local Deal variable as 
Kedia et al. (2007) and find that both types of board connections continue to have a positive 
and significant effect on ACARs. The Local Deal variable enters positively but not 
significantly.3
Corporate Governance and Board Characteristics of the Acquirer: It can be expected 
that firms with good corporate governance and high quality directors are more likely to have 
board connections to other firms since their directors might be in great demand from other 
firms. At the same time, these firms could be expected to undertake better quality M&A 
deals due to their high quality directors. In other words, better corporate governance and 
higher quality directors of acquirers could be the factor driving both board connections and 
better M&A outcomes. To address this possibility, in Table 4 Regression (6) we include the 
acquirer’s GIM index of corporate governance developed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003). We control for the experience of acquirer directors by including a variable Director 
Age defined as the average age of the directors on the board of the acquirer. We also include 
a variable Board Size defined as the logarithm of the total number of directors on the board 
of the acquirer, and a variable Board Independence defined as the fraction of independent 
directors on the board of the acquirer. Finally, we include a variable Board Connectedness 
measuring the fraction of acquirer directors holding three or more directorships. Our sample 
size in this specification reduces to 1,223 because the GIM governance index is available 
only for S&P1500 companies.  

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  , where  and  ( and ) are the latitudes (longitudes) of the two points (in radians) 
respectively, and r denotes the radius of the earth (approximately 3,963 statutory miles). 
3 We obtain similar results if we use different cutoff points (75km and 125km) for the distance between the 
acquirer and target firm’s headquarters in defining local deals.  
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Our main finding on the effect of board connections on acquirer returns survives 
controlling for these corporate governance variables. The GIM index has a negative and 
significant coefficient, consistent with Masulis et al. (2007) that acquirers with weaker 
governance obtain worse announcement returns. We also find that the average age of the 
directors on the acquirer board is positively related to acquirer announcement returns, which 
support the positive role of director experience in M&As. The Board Connectedness variable
is insignificant, suggesting that our results are unlikely to be driven by high quality directors 
holding a large number of board seats in other firms.  
The Board Connectedness variable is important for the robustness of our results for 
another reason. As we mentioned previously, Schonlau and Singh (2009) show that firms 
with boards which are more connected to other firms are more likely to participate in M&As 
both as an acquirer and as a target, and obtain better performance in the long run after their 
M&A activity.  It is plausible to expect that a firm whose board has many connections to 
other firms is more likely to have a board connection to the target it acquires. Given that 
direct board connections between the acquirer and the target continue to matter for acquirer 
announcement returns after including the Board Connectedness variable, our paper suggests 
that it is the direct board connection between the acquirer and the target which results in 
higher acquirer announcement returns, rather than how connected the acquirer’s board is to 
other firms.  
Finally, in Table 4 Regression (7), we include all the control variables together from 
each robustness specification, and continue to find that board connections remain positively 
related to acquirer announcement returns.  
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Unobservable Firm Characteristics: To further control for any other unobservable or 
omitted acquirer firm characteristics which could affect both board connections and M&A 
outcomes, we conduct an analysis with firm fixed-effects. Specifically, we compare the deals 
in which the acquirer has a board connection to the target with those deals by the same
acquirer in which the acquirer has no board connection to the target. Put differently, keeping 
the identity of the acquirer fixed, we compare the connected and non-connected deals made 
by the same acquirer. Our sample size reduces significantly to 318 in this specification since 
we focus only on the deals made by those acquirers which undertake at least one acquisition 
where they have a board connection to the target. 
Table 5 presents our subsample CAR results. Importantly, our key result on the 
positive relation between board connections and acquirer announcement returns continues to 
hold. Acquirers we consider in this subsample obtain greater announcement returns from 
those acquisitions where they have a connection to the target. This result implies that it is the 
board connection between the acquirer and the target which leads to higher acquirer returns 
as opposed to some unobservable characteristics of the connected acquirers. We also run the 
same baseline regression as in Table 4 Regression (1) using this subsample of acquisitions 
made by connected acquirers. In untabulated results, we continue to find both first and 
second-degree board connections remain positively related to acquirer announcement returns, 
although the significance levels are only 20% and 11% because of the considerably reduced 
sample size. 
Our results so far suggest that acquirers obtain greater announcement returns in the 
presence of both a first and second-degree board connection. It is possible that board 
connections help value creation from a deal by facilitating information flow between the 
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acquirer and the target. It is also possible that they allow acquirers to gain an information 
advantage about attractive takeover targets and acquire them at more favorable prices, 
relative to outside bidders with no connection to the target. To understand better the 
economic mechanisms driving greater acquirer announcement returns in connected 
transactions, we proceed with an analysis of target announcement returns, takeover 
premiums, and combined acquirer and target announcement returns in the following sections. 
3.2.2 Target Announcement Returns and Takeover Premiums 
In this section, we examine the effect of board connections on target announcement 
returns and takeover premiums received by target shareholders. First, we analyze target 
announcement returns in a multivariate framework where the dependent variable is the five-
day TCAR. The key independent variables are the same indicator variables First-degree 
Connection and Second-degree Connection as in the previous section. We also include the 
same set of control variables as in the ACAR regressions.  
In Table 6 Regression (1), we find that first-degree connections are negatively related 
to TCARs while second-degree connections are not significantly related to TCARs. This is 
consistent with our earlier univariate result that target abnormal returns are lower in first-
degree connected transactions relative to non-connected transactions, although the difference 
in the univariate comparison is not significant. A first-degree board connection is associated 
with a 5.2% reduction in the five-day target announcement returns, significant at the 5% 
level. The predicted effect of first-degree connections on TCARs is economically significant 
as well considering that the mean five-day TCAR in our sample is 21.12%.
One potential explanation for this result is that directors in first-degree connected 
transactions have an information advantage about the true value of the target and this 
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advantage allows them to acquire the target at a lower price, compared to other potential 
bidders with no connection to the target. Thus, we expect a lower takeover premium in first-
degree connected transactions. To examine this conjecture, we obtain a takeover premium 
measure PREM from the SDC, defined as the percentage difference between the offer price 
and target’s trading price four weeks prior to the announcement date. The mean takeover 
premiums are 38.0% and 38.7% in first and second-degree connected transactions 
respectively. For non-connected transactions, the mean takeover premium is 40.7%, slightly 
higher than those in connected transactions, although not at a significant level.
Using PREM as the dependent variable and our earlier key independent variables 
First-degree Connection and Second-degree Connection, Regression (2) in Table 6 presents 
the results on the relation between board connections and takeover premiums after 
controlling for the same firm and deal characteristics as before. We find that first-degree 
connections are negatively and significantly related to the level of takeover premiums. A 
first-degree board connection is associated with an 8.4% reduction in takeover premiums 
paid by acquirers. This effect is economically large given that the unconditional mean 
takeover premium in our sample is 40.5%. Thus, lower takeover premiums observed in first-
degree connected transactions provide an explanation for our earlier result that acquirers 
obtain larger announcement returns in first-degree connected transactions. Second-degree 
board connections, however, are not significantly associated with takeover premiums.  
A natural question that follows is why target shareholders would agree to a lower 
takeover premium in deals with a first-degree connection.  First, it is important to note that 
although TCARs are lower in the presence of a first-degree connection, target shareholders in 
such transactions still obtain sizeable returns at the acquisition announcement. The mean 
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five-day TCAR in first-degree connected transactions is 18.62%, significantly different from 
zero at the 1% level. Second, recall our earlier summary statistics from Table 2 that target 
firms in deals with a first-degree connection exhibit weaker financial and operational profile. 
Specifically, they have lower profitability measured by ROA, lower operating cash flow, and 
exhibit weaker industry-adjusted stock return performance before the acquisition 
announcement. Given their weaker financial and operational profile, their ability to negotiate 
a higher price or generate outside offers from other bidders might be limited. Hence, one can 
expect that acquirers with a board connection to such target firms benefit from their more 
informed position, and undertake these acquisitions at a more favorable price from the 
perspective of their shareholders. Consistent with this interpretation, in Table 6 Regression 
(3) we interact the First-degree Connection variable with the target’s operating cash flow and 
find that the negative effect of first-degree connections on takeover premiums is more 
pronounced for target firms with lower profitability. 
3.2.3 Combined Acquirer and Target Announcement Returns 
In this section we proceed with the analysis of combined announcement returns in 
order to understand whether board connections are significantly related to the overall value 
creation from a deal. Our dependent variable in this multivariate analysis is the five-day 
PCAR, and the key independent variables are First-degree Connection and Second-degree
Connection. We include the same set of control variables as in the ACAR and TCAR 
regressions.
  Table 7 Regression (1) shows that the PCARs are positively related to the Second-
degree Connection variable, suggesting that deals with a second-degree connection generate 
greater value creation at the acquisition announcement. A second-degree board connection 
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translates into a 1.8% increase in the five-day combined announcement returns. This effect is 
economically meaningful given the mean five-day PCAR of 1.03% for our sample. First-
degree board connections, on the other hand, are not significantly related to combined 
announcement returns.  
Taken together, our results from the univariate and multivariate analysis of 
announcement returns suggest that first and second-degree board connections have different 
implications for an M&A transaction. While first-degree board connections benefit acquirers, 
they do not imply greater overall value creation since combined announcement returns in 
first-degree connected deals are not significantly different from those in non-connected deals. 
The interesting role of first-degree connections is that they appear to affect the allocation of 
the surplus between the acquirer and the target. Keeping all else constant, first-degree 
connections lead acquirers to obtain greater share of the surplus and experience higher 
announcement returns. It is worth repeating that although target shareholders obtain a lower 
fraction of the surplus in the presence of a first-degree connection, they still experience 
significant amount of wealth creation since their five-day return around the acquisition 
announcement is 18.62%, significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The source of 
bargaining power for acquirers in first-degree connected transactions appears to originate 
from their board connection to underperforming firms which represent attractive takeover 
opportunities. Given their poor performance, it is expected that these target firms have a 
limited ability to demand a higher price from the connected bidder or to generate alternative 
offers from outside bidders. Second-degree connections, on the other hand, are associated 
with greater overall value creation from the deal in terms of combined announcement returns. 
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This result provides an explanation for why acquirers obtain larger announcement returns in 
such deals.4
   

4 The effects of board connections on target announcement returns, takeover premiums, and combined 
announcement returns remain robust when we include our earlier control variables from the ACAR regressions 
such as the physical distance between the acquirer and the target, the existence of a previous business relation 
between the acquirer and the target, and corporate governance variables, etc. Since corporate governance 
variables are available only for a small set of target firms in our sample, the sample size with these control 
variables drops considerably.  
CHAPTER 4 
BOARD CONNECTIONS AND LONG-RUN OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
The previous section shows that second-degree board connections are positively 
related to the overall value creation from the deal at the acquisition announcement, consistent 
with the view that they facilitate information flow between the connected firms and have a 
positive impact on the value created from the deal. In this section, we examine whether board 
connections also have a significant effect on the long-run operating performance of the newly 
merged firm after the deal completion. If board connections improve information flow 
between the connected firms and provide the connected directors with greater knowledge 
about each company’s business, operations, and culture, they may have a positive effect on 
the operating performance of the combined firm after the deal completion. 
We use the return on assets ROA as our measure of operating performance. For each 
fiscal year in the three-year period preceding the deal announcement, we calculate the 
industry-adjusted ROA of the acquirer and the target by subtracting the median ROA in their 
industry based on the two-digit SIC codes. Following Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), we 
construct a portfolio of the acquirer and the target, and calculate the industry-adjusted ROA 
of the portfolio for a given fiscal year as the weighted average of acquirer’s and target’s 
industry-adjusted ROA where the portfolio weights are calculated using the book values of 
the acquirer and the target at the beginning of that fiscal year. We use the three-year average 
of the industry-adjusted ROA as a measure of the pre-merger ROA of the acquirer and the 
target. We then track each acquisition for three years after the deal completion year, and 
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calculate the three-year average of the combined firm’s industry-adjusted ROA as our 
measure of post-merger ROA. Finally, we calculate the change in operating performance of 
the combined company ROA as the difference between post-merger ROA and pre-merger 
ROA.  We find that the mean ROA is 0.015 for first-degree connected transactions and 
0.030 for second-degree connected transactions, both higher than 0.004 for non-connected 
transactions. The difference in ROA between second-degree connected transactions and 
non-connected transactions is significant at the 10% level.
We next analyze the relation between board connections and long-run operating 
performance of the newly merged firm in a multivariate setting where our dependent variable 
is ROA and the key independent variables are First-degree Connection and Second-degree 
Connection. We also include the same set of control variables as in our earlier announcement 
return regressions. Table 7 Regression (2) shows that the Second-degree Connection variable 
has a positive and significant coefficient. A second-degree board connection leads to a 2.3% 
increase in the operating performance of the combined company adjusted for its industry and 
pre-merger operating performance. This result is supportive of our earlier finding that 
transactions with a second-degree connection are associated with greater value creation 
measured by combined abnormal returns around the announcement date. First-degree 
connections, on the other hand, are not significantly related to the operating performance of 
the combined firm, consistent with our earlier finding that they are not significantly related to 
overall wealth creation experienced by acquirer and target shareholders at the announcement 
date.
It is possible that directors who serve on the boards of both the acquirer and the target 
recuse themselves from the merger negotiation due to the potential for conflicts of interest 
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between acquirer and target shareholders.  In such situations, it may be common to hire a 
special panel of experts to oversee the merger negotiation. The need for a special panel of 
experts should be greater in the presence of a first-degree connection than a second-degree 
connection given that the potential for conflicts of interest is greater in first-degree 
connections. Hence, if a special panel of experts has a positive impact on M&A outcomes, 
combined acquirer and target announcement returns and post-deal operating performance 
should be better in first-degree connections since special panels are more likely to be hired in 
such deals. However, our results show that first-degree connections are not significantly 
related to value creation from the deal, while in second-degree connections where the need 
for special panels is presumably lower, we find greater amount of value creation both at the 
deal announcement and in the longer run after the deal completion. Thus, it is unlikely that 
our results are driven by the presence of special committees in connected transactions.1

1 Kisgen, Qian and Song (2009) find that the market reacts negatively towards transactions where the acquirer 
hires a special panel providing a fairness opinion. Hence, it is not clear whether special panel of experts plays a 
value adding role in M&A transactions. 

CHAPTER 5 
BOARD CONNECTIONS AND ADVISORY FEES 
Investment banks play an important role in the market for corporate control. They 
identify potential target firms, propose high synergy deals, and facilitate M&A transactions 
(McLaughlin (1990, 1992)). If firms in connected transactions have greater information and 
knowledge about deal profitability and source of synergy gains, they might have a lower 
need for investment banks for initiating, pricing, and structuring the deal, leading to the 
prediction that transaction costs in connected transactions should be lower. Given that the 
information advantage of the acquirers about the true value of the target should be greater in 
first-degree connections, we expect that transaction costs should be lower particularly in the 
presence of a first-degree connection. 
To test this prediction, we collect financial advisory data from the SDC. In our 
sample, an average M&A deal involves one financial advisor for the acquirer and one for the 
target. Because advisory fees are usually charged as a percentage of deal value, we calculate 
the percentage advisory fees as the ratio of dollar amount of advisory fees to the dollar 
amount of deal value. We find that acquirers on average pay a percentage fee of 0.55% in 
first-degree connected transactions, 0.40% in second-degree connected transactions, and 
0.62% in non-connected transactions. A similar pattern emerges for the advisory fees paid by 
target firms: the mean percentage fees are 0.77% and 0.64% for first-degree and second-
degree connected transactions respectively, and 0.84% for non-connected transactions. 
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To understand whether board connections are significantly related to advisory fees, 
we use a multivariate setting where our key independent variables are, as before, the First-
degree Connection and Second-degree Connection indicator variables. The dependent 
variable is the percentage fee paid by the acquirer in Table 8 Regression (1),  the percentage 
fee paid by the target in Regression (2), and the total percentage fee paid by the acquirer and 
the target in Regression (3). We also include a number of firm and deal characteristics such 
as deal size, acquirer size, method of payment, whether the deal is a diversifying acquisition, 
whether it is done in the form of a tender offer, and deal attitude. Firms with a greater level 
of M&A activity in the past may be expected to pay lower advisory fees because of their 
repeated business with investment banks. Hence, we also include in the regressions our 
earlier variable Acquirer Pre3YR Num of Deals which measures the total number of 
acquisitions an acquirer has made in the last three years, and the corresponding variable 
Target Pre3YR Num of Deals for target firms.  
 We find that both acquirer and target firms pay lower percentage financial advisory 
fees in the presence of a first-degree board connection. Regression (1) shows that having a 
first-degree connection reduces the percentage fees paid by acquirers by 0.22%. This is 
economically significant considering that acquirers in our sample pay an average percentage 
fee of 0.60%. Target firms also pay lower fees in first-degree connected transactions: the 
coefficient of the First-degree Connection variable in Regression (2) is -0.21 and significant 
at the 5% level. This is also economically important given that the mean percentage fee paid 
by targets in our sample is 0.83%. Finally, Regression (3) shows that the total percentage fees 
paid by the acquirer and the target are significantly lower in the presence of a first-degree 
connection. Economically, a first-degree connection leads to a 0.64% reduction from the 
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sample mean of 1.30%, reducing total percentage fees almost by half. These results are 
consistent with our conjecture that directors in the first-degree connections have an 
information advantage regarding the true underlying value of the target, leading to a lower 
need for the advisory role of investment banks in initiating and pricing the deal.
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines M&A transactions with a board connection between acquirer 
and target firms and presents evidence that acquirers obtain significantly higher 
announcement returns in such transactions. We study two types of board connections 
between acquirer and target firms. In first-degree connections, the acquirer and the target 
share a common director before the deal announcement. In second-degree connections, one 
director from the acquirer and one director from the target have been serving on the board of 
a third firm before the deal announcement.  
Our results suggest that first-degree connections benefit acquirers by providing them 
with an information advantage about the true value of the target firm, and by allowing them 
to acquire underperforming firms at an attractive price. In addition, advisory fees paid to 
investment banks are significantly lower in the presence of a first-degree connection. 
Second-degree connections, on the other hand, appear to facilitate efficient deal making as 
evidenced by greater overall value creation experienced by acquirer and target shareholders 
at the deal announcement, and better operating performance of the combined firm after the
deal completion. Overall, we conclude that deals with board connections between acquirer 
and target firms represent an important set of mergers which do not destroy value for 
acquirers.
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Table 1: Sample Distribution 
Panel A and B present the number of M&A transactions by announcement year and by acquirer industry 
classification respectively. Both the acquirer and the target are public firms with complete CRSP and Compustat 
information, and have proxy statements on EDGAR or have available director data in the RiskMetrics database 
in the year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement. Numbers for the full sample are presented first, 
followed by three subsamples based on the presence and the degree of board connections. First-degree 
connected transactions are the deals where the acquirer and the target share at least one common director. 
Second-degree connected transactions are the deals where at least one director from the acquirer and one 
director from the target sit together on the board of a third firm. The rest of the deals are classified as non-
connected transactions. 
Panel A: By Announcement Year 
Year Full 
Sample 
First-degree 
Connected
Second-degree 
Connected Non-Connected  
  Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
1996 66 1 1.5% 4 4.4% 61 4.0% 
1997 167 10 15.4% 14 15.4% 143 9.5% 
1998 229 7 10.8% 12 13.2% 210 13.9% 
1999 226 10 15.4% 16 17.6% 200 13.3% 
2000 181 11 16.9% 8 8.8% 162 10.7% 
2001 147 9 13.8% 5 5.5% 133 8.8% 
2002 57 4 6.2% 3 3.3% 50 3.3% 
2003 117 3 4.6% 2 2.2% 112 7.4% 
2004 117 1 1.5% 1 1.1% 115 7.6% 
2005 110 3 4.6% 5 5.5% 102 6.8% 
2006 119 3 4.6% 6 6.6% 110 7.3% 
2007 104 3 4.6% 12 13.2% 89 5.9% 
2008 24 0 0.0% 3 3.3% 21 1.4% 
Total 1,664 65 100.0% 91 100.0% 1,508 100.0% 
Panel B: By Acquirer Industry 
12 Fama-French  
 Ind. Classification 
Full 
Sample 
First-degree 
Connected
Second-degree 
Connected Non-Connected 
  Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Nondurables 54 3 4.6% 3 3.3% 48 3.2% 
Durables 22 0 0.0% 3 3.3% 19 1.3% 
Manufacturing 113 4 6.2% 7 7.7% 102 6.8% 
Energy 61 4 6.2% 5 5.5% 52 3.4% 
Chemical products 30 1 1.5% 5 5.5% 24 1.6% 
Business equipment 399 20 30.8% 14 15.4% 365 24.2% 
Telecom 63 1 1.5% 2 2.2% 60 4.0% 
Utilities 43 2 3.1% 4 4.4% 37 2.5% 
Wholesale and retail 91 4 6.2% 3 3.3% 84 5.6% 
Healthcare 144 8 12.3% 11 12.1% 125 8.3% 
Finance 516 15 23.1% 26 28.6% 475 31.5% 
Other 128 3 4.6% 8 8.8% 117 7.8% 
Total 1,664 65 100.0% 91 100.0% 1,508 100.0% 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
This table presents the mean summary statistics of 1,664 completed US mergers and acquisitions between 1996 
and 2008. Both the acquirer and the target are public firms with complete CRSP and Compustat information, 
and have proxy statements on EDGAR or have available director data in the RiskMetrics database in the year 
immediately prior to the acquisition announcement. Full sample means are displayed first, followed by means 
of three subsamples based on the presence and the degree of board connections. All variable definitions are in 
the Appendix. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (2)-(4) (3)-(4) 
Full 
Sample 
First-degree 
Connected
Second-degree 
Connected
Non-
Connected
# of observations 1,664 65 91 1,508     
Acquiror Characteristics    
Mkt cap ($Mil.) 11,998 8,135 24,186 11,429 ** 
Tobin's Q 2.15 2.45 2.22 2.14 
Leverage 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.21 * 
ROA 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 
OCF 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10 
Prior ind.-adjusted returns 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 
Target Characteristics    
Mkt cap ($Mil.) 1,338 841 3,769 1,212 *** 
Tobin's Q 1.86 1.88 2.03 1.85 
Leverage 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.20 ** 
ROA 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.06 * * 
OCF 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.06 * * 
Prior ind.-adjusted returns 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 * 
Deal Characteristics    
Transaction value ($Mil.) 1,926 1,272 5,256 1,754 *** 
Percentage of cash 34.17 30.38 34.11 34.34 
Percentage of stock 57.22 61.57 56.89 57.05 
Stock deal 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.69 
Diversifying acquisition 0.31 0.38 0.41 0.30 * 
Relative deal size 0.40 0.37 0.45 0.39 
Tender offer 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.13 
Hostile 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Merger of equals 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 *** 

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Table 5: Announcement Returns of Connected Acquirers 
This table presents the mean subsample acquirer returns (ACAR), target returns (TCAR), and combined 
portfolio returns (PCAR) over the three-day, five-day, and seven-day event windows around the acquisition 
announcement date. This subsample contains acquisitions of those acquirers where they have a board 
connection to the target in at least one of the acquisitions they undertake. Column (1) reports the full sample 
CARs, and Column (2), (3), (4) report the mean CARs for three subsamples based on the presence and the 
degree of board connections. The last two columns report the difference in the CARs between the first-degree 
connected transactions and the non-connected transactions and the second-degree connected transactions and 
the non-connected transactions, respectively. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (2)-(4) (3)-(4) 
 
Full 
Sample 
First-degree 
Connected 
Second-degree 
Connected 
Non-
Connected   
N 318 65 91 162 
ACAR  
 [-1,+1] -1.57*** -0.69 -0.89 -2.30*** 1.62* 1.42* 
 [-2,+2] -1.51*** 0.11 -0.72 -2.60*** 2.71** 1.87** 
 [-3,+3] -1.60*** -0.03 -0.68 -2.75*** 2.72* 2.07** 
TCAR  
 [-1,+1] 19.62*** 17.35*** 21.61*** 19.41*** -2.05 2.20 
 [-2,+2] 20.49*** 18.62*** 22.70*** 20.00*** -1.38 2.71 
 [-3,+3] 20.78*** 19.15*** 22.93*** 20.23*** -1.08 2.70 
PCAR  
 [-1,+1] 0.84** 1.40 2.47*** -0.30 1.70* 2.77*** 
 [-2,+2] 0.87** 1.92* 2.64*** -0.55 2.47** 3.19*** 
 [-3,+3] 0.81* 1.82 2.77*** -0.69 2.50* 3.46*** 
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Table 6: Determinants of Target Announcement Returns and Takeover Premiums 
This table presents OLS regressions for the sample of completed US mergers and acquisitions between 1996 
and 2008. The dependent variable in Regression (1) is TCAR, the cumulative abnormal returns of the target 
from two days before to two days after the deal announcement. The dependent variable in Regression (2) and 
(3) is the takeover premium measure from the SDC, defined as the percentage difference between the offer price 
and target firm’s trading price four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement date. All regressions control 
for calendar year fixed effects and twelve Fama-French industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed 
for brevity. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and firm 
clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
TCAR PREM PREM 
First-degree Connection -5.227** -8.398** -8.951** 
(-2.305) (-2.364) (-2.530) 
Second-degree Connection 1.858 -1.132 -1.086 
(0.921) (-0.422) (-0.405) 
Acquirer Size -0.340 -0.937** -0.944** 
(-1.198) (-2.088) (-2.101) 
Stock Deal -5.530*** -5.197*** -5.154*** 
(-4.580) (-2.906) (-2.880) 
Diversifying Acquisition 0.629 3.374* 3.394* 
(0.593) (1.950) (1.957) 
Relative Deal Size -6.178*** -2.717 -2.662 
(-6.585) (-1.580) (-1.548) 
Tender Offer 5.644*** 6.981*** 7.048*** 
(3.688) (2.945) (2.970) 
Hostile -2.041 12.858** 12.938** 
(-0.462) (1.970) (1.986) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.339 1.757*** 1.767*** 
(1.094) (3.161) (3.196) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.876 -5.270 -5.294 
(-0.271) (-1.083) (-1.091) 
Acquirer OCF 4.955 -4.815 -5.005 
(0.951) (-0.459) (-0.475) 
Acquirer Stock Price Run-up 4.232*** 11.649*** 11.630*** 
(2.889) (4.667) (4.663) 
Target Tobin's Q -1.053*** -1.215* -1.213* 
(-2.612) (-1.729) (-1.725) 
Target Leverage -2.814 -0.931 -0.999 
(-0.998) (-0.214) (-0.230) 
Target OCF -4.213 -10.302* -11.488* 
(-1.165) (-1.733) (-1.873) 
Target Stock Price Run-up -14.215*** -6.716** -6.631** 
(-9.066) (-2.406) (-2.371) 
First-degree Connection*Target OCF 26.589* 
(1.702) 
Constant 30.836*** 53.262*** 53.235*** 
(7.110) (8.291) (8.287) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,664 1,612 1,612 
Adj. R2 0.158 0.128 0.129 
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Table 7: Determinants of Combined Announcement Returns and Long-run Operating Performance 
This table presents OLS regressions for the sample of completed US mergers and acquisitions between 1996 
and 2008. The dependent variable in Regression (1) is PCAR, the cumulative abnormal returns of the combined 
portfolio of acquirer and target firms from two days before to two days after the deal announcement. The 
dependent variable in Regression (2) is ROA, the change in industry-adjusted ROA from three years before 
the deal announcement to three years after the deal completion. All regressions control for calendar year fixed 
effects and twelve Fama-French industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. T-statistics 
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and firm clustering are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
(1) (2) 
PCAR ROA 
First-degree Connection 0.916 0.001 
(0.921) (0.070) 
Second-degree Connection 1.821** 0.023* 
(2.530) (1.872) 
Acquirer Size -0.521*** 0.001 
(-4.412) (0.462) 
Stock Deal -2.327*** -0.001 
(-5.673) (-0.089) 
Diversifying Acquisition 0.083 0.007 
(0.203) (0.676) 
Relative Deal Size 1.847*** -0.008 
(3.666) (-1.376) 
Tender Offer 1.499*** 0.011 
(2.689) (0.965) 
Hostile 1.354 -0.028 
(0.941) (-1.265) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.297 0.004 
(-1.488) (1.506) 
Acquirer Leverage 1.062 0.075*** 
(0.810) (2.966) 
Acquirer OCF 5.428** -0.253*** 
(2.316) (-4.386) 
Acquirer Stock Price Run-up -1.350 0.004 
(-1.601) (0.302) 
Target Tobin's Q -0.139 0.004 
(-0.614) (1.179) 
Target Leverage -1.784 0.032** 
(-1.629) (1.982) 
Target OCF -1.750 -0.068** 
(-0.965) (-2.129) 
Target Stock Price Run-up -1.035 -0.011 
(-1.452) (-1.073) 
Constant 7.199*** -0.016 
(4.263) (-0.678) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,664 1,071 
Adj. R2 0.112 0.119 
44

Table 8: Determinants of Financial Advisory Fees 
This table presents OLS regressions for the sample of completed US mergers and acquisitions between 1996 
and 2008. The dependent variables in Regression (1), (2), and (3) are the percentage financial advisory fees paid 
by the acquirer, percentage financial advisory fees paid by the target, and the total percentage financial advisory 
fees paid by the acquirer and the target, respectively. The percentage advisory fees are calculated as the ratio of 
the dollar amount of advisory fees charged by financial advisors to the dollar amount of the deal value. All 
regressions control for calendar year fixed effects and twelve Fama-French industry fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed for brevity. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
(White (1980)) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
(1) (2) (3) 
Acquirer  Target Total 
First-degree Connection -0.215* -0.213** -0.635*** 
(-1.732) (-2.168) (-3.136) 
Second-degree Connection 0.030 0.015 -0.009 
(0.362) (0.289) (-0.081) 
Deal Size -0.136*** -0.236*** -0.327*** 
(-3.847) (-8.399) (-5.591) 
Acquirer Size -0.035 0.027 -0.036 
(-1.037) (1.532) (-0.687) 
Stock Deal -0.151 0.010 -0.159 
(-1.510) (0.213) (-0.698) 
Diversifying Acquisition -0.003 0.070* 0.048 
(-0.052) (1.795) (0.478) 
Tender Offer 0.004 0.035 0.115 
(0.046) (0.649) (0.601) 
Hostile 0.088 0.069 0.166 
(1.303) (0.806) (1.117) 
Acquirer Pre3YR Num of Deals -0.007 -0.004 
(-1.119) (-0.290) 
Target Pre3YR Num of Deals 0.016 0.015 
(1.360) (0.680) 
Constant 1.803*** 2.009*** 3.551*** 
(8.290) (12.092) (8.331) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 477 1,162 446 
Adj. R2 0.359 0.314 0.427 
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APPENDIX:
Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions Data Source 
Panel A: measures of acquisition performance
ACAR Cumulative abnormal percentage return for the acquirer 
using the market model estimated using the return data for 
the period (-210, -11). 
CRSP
TCAR Cumulative abnormal percentage return for the target using 
the market model estimated using the return data for the 
period (-210, -11). 
CRSP
PCAR Cumulative abnormal percentage return for a value-weighted 
portfolio of the acquirer and the target using the market 
model estimated using the portfolio return data for the period 
(-210, -11). The weights are based on the market 
capitalizations of the acquirer and the target at the sixth 
trading day prior to the announcement date. The target’s 
weight is adjusted for the acquirer’s toehold.
CRSP
PREM Premium of offer price to target trading price four weeks 
prior to the original announcement date. 
SDC
ROA Change in industry-adjusted ROA from three years prior to 
the deal announcement to three years after deal completion. 
Compustat
Panel B: firm and deal characteristics
Firm Size Natural logarithm of market value of equity calculated as the 
number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at 
the eleventh trading day prior to deal announcement. 
CRSP
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets over book value of assets. Compustat
Leverage  Book value of debt over book value of assets. Compustat
ROA Operating income before depreciation, scaled by book value 
of assets. 
Compustat
OCF Sales minus the cost of goods sold, sales and general 
administration expenses, and working capital change, scaled 
by book value of assets.
Compustat
Stock Price Run-up Buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) during the period (-
210,-11) with CRSP value-weighted return as the market 
index. 
CRSP
Prior Ind-Adjusted 
Returns 
Industry-adjusted returns during the six-month period prior 
to deal announcement.
CRSP
Deal Size Natural logarithm of dollar amount of deal value. SDC
Stock Deal Indicator variable: 1 for deals financed partially or fully with 
stock, 0 otherwise.
SDC
Diversifying 
Acquisition 
Indicator variable: 1 if acquirer and target do not share the 
same 2-digit SIC code, 0 otherwise.
SDC
Relative Deal Size Deal value divided by acquirer’s market value of equity. SDC/CRSP
Tender Offer  Indicator variable: 1 for tender offers, 0 otherwise. SDC
Hostile Indicator variable: 1 if the bid is hostile, 0 otherwise. SDC
Pre3YR Num of Total number of acquisitions a firm has made in the past SDC
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Deals three years preceding the current acquisition announcement.  
Corr(Stock Return) Correlation of stock returns between acquirer and target 
firms in the six-month period ending at the one month prior 
to acquisition announcement.
CRSP
Previous Business 
Relation 
Indicator variable: 1 if there are strategic alliances or joint 
ventures between acquirers and targets in the three years 
prior to the announcement, 0 otherwise.
SDC
Toehold Indicator variable: 1 if the acquirer owns a non-zero 
percentage of target’s stock prior to announcement date, 0 
otherwise. 
SDC
Local Deal Indicator variable: 1 if the acquirer’s headquarter is located 
within 100km of the target’s headquarters, 0 otherwise. 
Compustat
GIM Index Governance index based on 24 antitakeover provisions. RiskMetrics
Director Age Average age of board of directors. RiskMetrics
Board Size Natural logarithm of total number of directors on board. RiskMetrics
Board Independence Percentage of independent directors on board. RiskMetrics
Board 
Connectedness 
Percentage of directors holding three or more directorships. RiskMetrics
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